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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________
No. 10-1322
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES E. HALL,
Appellant
______________
APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 05-366)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta Ambrose
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 20, 2010
______________
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: October 28, 2010)
______________
OPINION
______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge
Appellant James E. Hall (“Hall”) contends that the sentence imposed upon him for
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violating the conditions of his supervised release was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. He additionally contends that the sentence violates his due process rights
because the government failed to provide any evidence to support one of the bases for his
violation. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm Hall‟s sentence.
I. FACTS
We write solely for the benefit of the parties and recount only the essential facts.
On March 13, 2006, Hall pled guilty to a two count indictment, charging him with
(1) a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) (uttering and possessing a forged check) and (2) a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1701 (obstruction of the mail). (App. 51-72.) That same day,
the District Court held a bond revocation hearing, based on Hall‟s violation of several
conditions of his pretrial release. (Id. at 74-86.) As a result of the hearing, Hall was
placed on electronic monitoring. (Id. at 85.) Hall never allowed the electronic
monitoring to be set up, (id. at 90-91), and he violated other conditions of pretrial release
(id. at 92, 96-97). Based on these violations, Hall‟s pretrial release bond was revoked on
April 10, 2006. (Id. at 100.)
On June 28, 2006, Hall was sentenced to a term of twelve months and one day on
Count One, and six months on Count Two. Both sentences were to run concurrently.
Restitution was also ordered. The District Court waived the fine. Hall also received
three years of supervised release, to commence upon his release from custody. (Id. at
122-23.) Hall completed his federal sentence of incarceration, and subsequently served a
state sentence of incarceration in North Carolina on unrelated charges. He was released
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on October 30, 2008. (Id. at 129.) Due to the terms of supervised release in his state
sentence, he was not allowed to return to Pennsylvania immediately upon his release.
(Id.) He returned to Pennsylvania on March 20, 2009. (Id.)
Upon his return to Pennsylvania, he failed to contact the Probation Office, as
required. (Id.) He also failed to respond to letters from the Probation Office. (Id.) At a
revocation hearing on September 11, 2009, the District Court heard testimony from the
Probation Officer assigned to Hall‟s case. The Probation Officer recounted her
unsuccessful attempts to contact Hall, beginning July 15, 2009, as well as Hall‟s
untruthfulness regarding his employment and his sisters‟ concern about checks missing
from their grandmother‟s check book to which Hall had access when living with his
grandmother while on supervised release. (Id. at 142-51.) The District Court placed Hall
on electronic monitoring, noting it was accepting the Probation Officer‟s
recommendation to “give [him] one more chance . . . to comply.” (Id. at 161.)
Hall did not heed the District Court‟s warning, and failed to comply with the
conditions of electronic monitoring. (Id. at 164-65.) In fact, he failed to appear at the
next scheduled revocation hearing on November 9, 2009. (Id. at 164.) The District Court
issued a bench warrant, and Hall was subsequently arrested on January 8, 2010. (Id. at
172.)
At the revocation hearing on January 13, 2010, the District Court heard testimony
from Hall, as well as two probation officers. The testimony addressed Hall‟s failure to
comply with electronic monitoring; his failure to report to the Probation Office; his
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failure to report for mental health testing; his failure to appear at the revocation hearing
on November 9, 2009; his state criminal charges that were dismissed; and positive drug
test results. (Id. at 172-88.) The District Court found, and Hall‟s counsel agreed, that
Hall had committed a Class C violation, and calculated the sentencing range established
by the Sentencing Guidelines to be six to twelve months. (Id. at 191, 193.) After
addressing the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court concluded that Hall had lied during
his testimony, and sentenced Hall to twenty-one months of incarceration, which was the
time remaining on his term of supervised release. (Id. at 197-98.)
II. Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. Standard of Review
Following the Supreme Court‟s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), “it is now well understood that an appellate court reviews a sentence for
reasonableness with regard to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We see no
reason why that standard should not also apply to a sentence imposed upon a revocation
of supervised release, and we so hold.” U.S. v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007)
(internal citations omitted). “Subsequently, Gall made it plain that we assess
unreasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” U.S. v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558,
564 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38 (2007)).
“In order for a sentence to be reasonable, the record must demonstrate that the
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sentencing court gave „meaningful consideration‟ to [the § 3553(a)] factors. [1] The court
need not, however, discuss a defendant‟s clearly nonmeritorious arguments, or otherwise
„discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear
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Section 3553(a) provides that:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for
(A) [the particular offense and the particular defendant by the Sentencing
Guidelines]; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code,
taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy
statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments
have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into
amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28);
(5) any pertinent policy statement-(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of
title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such
policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such
amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission
into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
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the court took the factors into account in sentencing.‟” Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 (quoting
U.S. v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)). “In addition to demonstrating that it
gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors, a sentencing court must
demonstrate that it reasonably applied those factors to the circumstances of the case. Our
review in this regard is highly deferential.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Stated
another way, our review has two steps. First, we must ensure that the district court
committed no procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the Guidelines range.
Second, we must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Tomko, 562
F.3d at 567 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
When considering a sentence imposed for revocation of supervised release, other
factors apply. That is, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) permits a court to sentence a defendant to up
to two years of imprisonment for violation of a class C offense, after consideration of the
§ 3553(a) factors.2 Section 3583(e) also allows a district judge to require a defendant to
serve the unexpired term of supervised release in prison.
IV. Discussion
A.
Hall argues that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively flawed. We
disagree.
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Notably, § 3583(e) omits § 3553(a)(2)(A) (describing the punitive purposes of
sentencing) and § 3553(a)(3) (“the kinds of sentences available”) from the factors to be
considered when sentencing a defendant for a violation of supervised release.
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Procedurally, the District Court correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines
range. The District Court also considered the § 3553(a) factors, and then imposed
sentence. While Hall claims the District Court did not mention any § 3553(a) factors,
there is no requirement that the District Court recite the factors verbatim. Rather, the
record simply must demonstrate that the court considered the factors. Bungar, 478 F.3d
at 543. Here, the District Judge noted her familiarity with Hall‟s criminal history, both
generally and in connection with the present offense. (App. 196-97.) She also
acknowledged the need to provide deterrence to future wrongdoing, and the need to
protect at least one member of the public — Hall‟s grandmother — from further crimes.
She noted the range of sentences available, and, in fact, had already attempted to impose
a less restrictive sentence for a prior violation by placing Hall on electronic monitoring.
As the record demonstrates, this effort was to no avail. The District Court did not discuss
any relevant policy statements, nor did she comment on the need to avoid sentencing
disparities. However, there is no requirement that the District Court address every single
factor so long as the majority of the factors were addressed. Id. Procedurally, the
District Court‟s sentence was reasonable.
Substantively, Hall argues that the District Court‟s failure to consider every
available alternative sentence, such as sending him to a half-way house, combined with
the length of his sentence, renders his sentence unreasonable. Hall bases this argument
on several factors: his belief that this was his “first real revocation;” the length of the
sentence compared to his sentence for his original offense; and the deviation from the
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Guidelines range. (Br. for Appellant 17.)
Contrary to Hall‟s assertion, this was his second revocation hearing, and it, like the
hearing in September, cited him for numerous violations. Further, there is no
requirement that the sentence for a revocation of supervised release be less than the
sentence for the original offense. U.S. v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We
decline to find a sentence imposed upon revocation unreasonable simply because it
exceeds the initial sentence of imprisonment when the District Court has ably identified
the reasons warranting such punishment.”). Finally, district courts are permitted to
deviate from the Guidelines range, so long as they articulate reasons for doing so. Here,
the District Court stated reasons for the departure, which, upon review, we find to be
reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.
B.
Hall also argues that the case should be remanded because the government failed
to introduce any evidence to support the allegation that Hall failed to complete his mental
health evaluation. Hall acknowledges that sufficient evidence existed to support the
finding that he committed one Class C violation, so his Guidelines range would not
change. However, he believes he is entitled to remand for a resentencing since the failure
to produce evidence was a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.
“A district court must find „by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
violated a condition of supervised release. . . .‟” U.S. v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d
Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). The factual findings supporting the decision to
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revoke supervised release are reviewed for clear error. Id.
According to the Petition on Supervised Release, on September 22, 2009, Hall
appeared two hours late for his appointment with Dr. Robert Coufal and was unable to
complete the mental health evaluation. He was instructed to return on September 24,
2009. He failed to do so. (App. 50.) In an effort to provide an “explanation for some of
the failures on his part,” (id. at 171), Hall testified at the revocation hearing on January
13, 2010. According to Hall, he went to Dr. Coufal‟s office twice — “two days back to
back,” and then he “never heard anything from [Dr. Coufal‟s assistant] or Dr. Coufel [sic]
since.” (Id. at 181.)
After hearing the testimony introduced by both the government and Hall, the
District Court found all of Hall‟s testimony to be untruthful. Specifically, the District
Court stated that “I think you have lied here today to me,” and “I don‟t know why you
left the mental health evaluation and didn‟t return when you were supposed to. But you
didn‟t do it.” (Id. at 97.)
Given the evidence presented, the District Court did not clearly err in concluding
that Hall did not complete the mental health evaluation. Even if the District Court had
accepted Hall‟s testimony that he attended two sessions at Dr. Coufal‟s office as truthful,
his testimony supports the finding that he failed to complete the mental health evaluation.
He testified that he participated in some tests with Dr. Coufal‟s assistant. Nowhere did
he state that he had completed the evaluation. Rather, his testimony supported the
statement in the Petition on Supervised Release that he failed to complete the mental
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health evaluation.
Looking at the record as a whole, the District Court did not err in concluding Hall
failed to complete the mental health evaluation. Evidence existed to support the District
Court‟s finding that Hall failed to complete the mental health evaluation. We see no
reason for the government to introduce evidence on this issue, as Hall suggests, when
Hall‟s own testimony, introduced before the government‟s witnesses took the stand,
supported the District Court‟s conclusion.3
V. Conclusion
We find that Hall‟s sentence is not procedurally or substantively defective. We
also conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in rejecting Hall‟s explanation as
to his failure to complete the mental health evaluation. Therefore, we will affirm Hall‟s
sentence.
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Section 3583(e)(3) requires a district court to “find[] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release;” it does not place
any burden of production on the government.
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